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 The information technology project control literature has documented that clan control is often essential in
 complex multistakeholder projects for project success. However, instituting clan control in such conditions
 is challenging as people come to a project with diverse skills and backgrounds. There is often insufficient time
 for clan control to develop naturally. This paper investigates the question , "How can clan control be enacted
 in complex IT projects? " Recognizing social capital as a resource , we conceptualize a clan as a group with
 strong social capital (i.e., where its members have developed their structural, cognitive, and relational ties to
 the point that they share common values and beliefs and are committed to a set of peer norms). We theorize
 that the enactment of clan control is a dual process of (1) building the clan by developing its social capital
 dimensions (structural, cognitive, and relational ties) or reappropriating social capital from elsewhere and
 (2) leveraging the clan by reinforcing project-facilitating shared values, beliefs, and norms, and inhibiting
 those that impede the achievement of project goals. We explore how clan control was enacted in a large IT
 project at a major logistics organization in which clan control was quickly instituted to avoid an impending
 project failure. Our research contributes to theory in three ways: (1) we reconcile the two differing views of
 clan control into a single framework, (2) we explain the role of controllers in enacting clan control, and (3) we
 clarify how formal control can be employed to develop clan control.
 Keywords: Behavioral control theory, clan control, formal control, project management, project control, IT
 projects, social capital, enterprise systems
 Introduction ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■
 In complex multistakeholder projects such as organization-
 wide ERP implementations, representatives from various
 ^ale Goodhue was the accepting senior editor for this paper. Jan Pries-Heje
 served as the associate editor.
 departments and business units must work hand-in-hand with
 internal IT professionals and external vendors. In such pro-
 jects, stakeholders often do not have prior working relation-
ships and must quickly work toward a common goal: the
 delivery of systems that meet functional requirements, on
 time, within budget, and at acceptable quality. A portfolio of
 controls comprising formal and informal controls is needed to
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 align the efforts of stakeholders. While prior research
 observes that formal control (e.g., project milestones, project
 budgets, and systems development methodologies) dominates
 the portfolio, particularly when a vendor is involved (Choud-
 hury and Sabherwal 2003), the literature also documents the
 need for informal clan control (Kirsch 2004; Kohli and
 Kettinger 2004; Perrow 1986). Unlike behavior and outcome
 control which rely on the direct application of formal power
 or organizational authority to control, clan control draws on
 interactions among members of a clan to direct, influence, or
 regulate others to achieve project goals. These interactions
 are realized in the form of norms, peer sanctions, rituals, and
 ceremonies.
 As controllers, project managers often have to get controllees
 from diverse groups, such as users, consultants, and IT per-
 sonnel, to work together to deliver the project. Newell et al.
 (2004), for example, note that knowledge for complex IT
 projects is often dispersed. Collective knowledge must be
 generated through interaction, negotiation, and learning to
 achieve shared understanding of organizational processes.
 Stakeholders do better work if they share overall group
 objectives and adhere to group values and norms. However,
 stakeholders often come from distinct occupational com-
 munities steeped in their individual craft and culture (Van
 Maanen and Barley 1984). Project team members may be
 working together for the first time, and are usually not a clan
 at the start of the project.
 The absence of a clan makes clan control unlikely at project
 initiation. When project individuals have distinct agendas,
 and lack common interests, clan control is difficult to enact
 (Ouchi 1979; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983). Also, given tight
 project schedules, there is often insufficient time for a clan to
 develop in situ through socialization (Wilkins and Ouchi
 1983). Hence, instituting clan control is a challenge. The
 issue is further complicated by the need to exercise clan con-
 trol at project initiation as it is most needed during require-
 ments analysis, when disparate stakeholder groups must work
 jointly to arrive at a common design (Kirsch 2004). More-
 over, the uncertainty of complex projects makes it difficult to
 precisely define outcomes and desired behaviors for the
 effective exertion of formal control; prior studies note the
 importance of clan control in driving complex projects
 (Drummond 1996; Kirsch 2004; Kohli and Kettinger 2004;
 McFarlan and Dailey 1999). Despite the widespread recog-
 nition of the criticality of clan control (Cardinal et al. 2004;
 Kirsch 1997), the project control literature has noted many IT
 projects with insufficient levels of clan control (Choudhury
 and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997).
 The inherently vague concept of clan control is also a prob-
 lem. Clan control is often "the other control," deployed when
 outcomes are unclear and behavior hard to specify (Kirsch
 1996). Prior research recognizes the importance of clan
 control, but has not found it consistently in all projects
 (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997; Wilkins and
 Ouchi 1 983). Moreover, it is unclear how clan control relates
 to other control modes in a balanced portfolio (Kirsch 1997).
 Control is defined as being between a controller and a
 controllee (Kirsch 1997). However, while the controller of
 formal control is clearly higher in the organizational hier-
 archy, the controller in clan control is often portrayed as a
 peer(Jaworski 1988; Jaworski et al. 1993;Kirsch 1996;Kohli
 and Kettinger 2004). This creates tension, as the formal
 controller may have goals separate from the clan. Some
 suggest this tension requires a trade-off (Cardinal et al. 2004;
 Gittell 2000; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003), where formal
 control is reduced to foster clan control. Others suggest
 having more clan and formal control increases the likelihood
 of project success (Henderson and Lee 1992; Long et al.
 2002).
 Thus, besides elaborating on the concept of clan control, this
 paper seeks to ascertain how it can be enacted in complex IT
 projects to increase the likelihood of project success. We use
 social capital as the lens for theorizing about clan control.
 Through this theoretical lens, we clarify and enrich the
 conceptualization of clan control, and identify how it can be
 enacted in complex projects. We also explore the role of
 controllers in facilitating the enactment of clan control.
 The next sections provide an overview of clan control
 research before introducing the social capital lens and elabo-
 rating on the new insights it brings. Later sections outline our
 research methodology, case findings, analysis and discussion,
 and our conclusion.
 Clan Control in IT Projects
 Consistent with other modes of control in the IT project con-
 trol literature (Eisenhardt 1985, 1988, 1989a; Govindarajan
 and Fisher 1990; Kirsch 1996, 1997; Tiwana and Keil 2007),
 clan control aims to direct, influence, or regulate others to
 achieve project goals. A clan is a culturally homogeneous
 group where members share common values, beliefs, and
 norms (Ouchi and Price 1978). Unlike behavioral and out-
 come controls which rely on formal power or organizational
 authority, clan control draws on peer monitoring and sanc-
 tions to promulgate shared values, beliefs, and norms. Clan
 control is especially relevant when outcomes are unclear and
 behavior is hard to specify (Kirsch 1996, 2004).
 While there is strong consensus on the importance of clan
 control, its conceptualization has remained ambiguous in the
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 literature with "overlaps and inconsistencies across the var-
 ious conceptualizations" (Kirsch 2004, p. 375). One research
 stream sees clan control as drawing on shared values, beliefs,
 and norms to align behaviors and project goals. This pre-
 supposes the existence of an effective clan. For example, clan
 controls can be seen as actions against deviations from social
 norms (Jaworski 1988, Jaworski et al. 1993). Kohli and
 Kettinger (2004) suggest clan control arises from adherence
 to deep-rooted "common agreement." Clan control thus
 leverages on the informal power of an existing clan to align
 behaviors and project goals. But how such a clan comes into
 existence is generally not discussed.
 Others conceptualize clan control as developing and building
 a clan through socialization mechanisms. Rowe and Wright's
 (1997) mechanisms of clan control (e.g., training, socializa-
 tion) are intended to reduce dissimilarities across individuals
 to facilitate clan development. Similarly, Choudhury and
 Sabherwal (2003) highlight the need to "promulgate"
 common values, beliefs, and philosophy to build the clan.
 Successful deployment of clan control in this concep-
 tualization achieves an effective clan, typically manifested by
 the emergence of norms that facilitate success in a project or
 organizational endeavor (Kirsch 1996, 1997; Ouchi 1980).
 The two conceptualizations of clan control, as leveraging an
 existing clan and building a new clan, need to be reconciled.
 They also raise questions about how clan control can be
 enacted in complex IT projects. Leveraging an existing clan
 is difficult as the project team, comprising members from the
 vendor and diverse user groups, is usually not a clan. Con-
 versely, building a clan is a slow and emergent process
 (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983). A complex project requires the
 team to become a clan in a short period of time. Hence, both
 conceptualizations of clan control pose challenges to the
 quick enactment of clan control in complex projects.
 We address this problem by applying a social capital lens to
 the concept of clan control. Such a lens is appropriate as both
 clan control and social capital focus on social relationships
 and deploying socialization mechanisms. Social capital is
 linked to clan control as it is often deployed purposefully with
 a hint of control orientation. Social capital provides a basis
 for facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam 1993) and makes
 "possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be
 attainable in its absence" (Coleman 1990, p. 202). Recent
 studies have drawn strong parallels between clan control and
 social capital (Kirsch et al. 2010).
 This paper views clans as groups with high social capital.
 This perspective provides a clearer conceptualization of clan
 control that reconciles the apparently inconsistent views of
 clan control as actions facilitating the creation of a new clan
 and as actions drawing on the norms of an existing clan to
 achieve goals. It also provides guidance on the important
 practical issue of how to facilitate the enactment of clan
 control in managing complex projects.
 Social Capital as a Lens for Clan Control
 Social capital2 is the resource associated with networks, and
 relationships between people that facilitate cooperation and
 collective action (Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1988; Putnam
 1993). Unlike other forms of capital embodied in machines,
 objects, or humans, social capital inheres in the relations
 among actors (Kankanhalli et al. 2005; Newell et al. 2004;
 Wasko and Faraj 2005). Members of religious organizations
 or recreational clubs, for example, often have strong social
 capital (Green and Brock 2005; Putnam 1993). Members
 within such groups are more willing to exchange favors and
 help facilitate collective action (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
 The rich interaction created by social networks also fosters
 strong cooperation among group members. Indeed, some
 researchers treat groups with strong social capital and clans
 almost interchangeably (Adler and Kwon 2002; Sturgess
 2000). This paper is aligned with such research. We define
 a clan as a group with strong social capital (i.e., where mem-
 bers develop social ties to the point they share common
 beliefs, values, and norms).
 A social capital lens suggests that the enactment of clan
 control requires the building of social capital among mem-
 bers. Like physical or financial capital, building social capital
 requires time and effort. The recognition that social capital
 has structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions (Nahapiet
 and Ghoshal 1 998) suggests that building strong social capital
 involves concerted efforts to develop and enhance structural,
 cognitive, and relational ties among members, which in turn
 leads to shared norms, beliefs, and values.
 Structural ties provide channels for interaction, allowing
 behaviors, beliefs, or values to be transmitted to others and
 perpetuated. Cognitive ties provide a common language and
 perspective to communicate and interpret norms, beliefs, and
 2More specifically, our conceptualization of social capital is internal,
 "bonding" at the project group level, unlike Adler and Kwon' s (2002) con-
 cept of external social capital that refers to members' relational connected-
 ness outside the group, "bridging." Many complex IT project teams are
 cross-functional in nature. Teams are assembled with members who are
 experts or potential brokers to needed expertise, knowledge, or resources.
 The focus of our paper is on the challenge of bringing together these people
 from diverse backgrounds.
 MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2/June 2012 579
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Tue, 17 Mar 2020 07:13:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Chua et al./Enacting Clan Control in Complex IT Projects
 values. Relational ties strengthen trust which promotes com-
 mitment to group norms, values, and beliefs. The structural,
 cognitive, and relational dimensions of social capital are
 highly interrelated and mutually reinforcing (Nahapiet and
 Ghoshal 1998); developing one dimension strengthens others.
 The network of structural, cognitive, and relational ties not
 only leads to the emergence of clan norms, values, and
 beliefs, but also enables these to be enforced through peer
 monitoring and rewards/sanctions (Barron and Gjerde 1997;
 Erez et al. 2002; Feller et al. 2008; Horné 2009; Kandel and
 Lazear 1992; Lave and Wenger 1991; Sewell 1998;
 Williamson 1983, 1985).
 The successful building of a clan and the corresponding emer-
 gence of shared beliefs, values, and norms does not imply
 clan control. Like human capital possessed by the clan, the
 clan's social capital may lie idle, be underutilized, or even be
 misused (Bicchieri 2006; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). For
 example, a clan could evolve a norm of leaving a workplace
 early, or a norm where problems are suppressed. The con-
 troller must "guide" and channel social capital in the clan so
 shared beliefs, values, and norms helpful to a project are
 retained and reinforced, while norms that impede the project
 are inhibited.
 Viewing clans as groups with high social capital helps
 reconcile the two views of clan control. Enacting clan control
 consists of two distinct but interdependent processes of
 building the clan and leveraging the clan. Each process is
 insufficient for effective clan control. Viewing the enactment
 of clan control only as the building of a clan is not sufficient
 as shared values, beliefs, and norms that emerge may not
 contribute to project goals. Viewing the enactment of clan
 control as leveraging the clan is similarly incomplete as it pre-
 supposes the existence of a clan to ensure the effective peer
 enforcement of shared norms. Such a clan cannot be assumed
 in many large, newly formed project teams.3
 The conceptualization of clan control as a dual process is
 furthermore supported by process theories of team building
 (Kozlowski and Ilgen 2006). Tuckman (1965) proposes that
 all teams go through four phases of development: forming,
 storming, norming, and performing. Drexler et al. (1988)
 3The conceptualization of clan control as the dual process of building social
 capital and leveraging norms applies equally to an experienced project team
 that is already a clan. First, like all other sources of capital, one must
 continuously invest in social capital for it to be productive. As much as one
 must maintain a machine, one must continually build structures, shared
 language, and relationships. Second, projects are by their nature, unique.
 The entire set of norms beneficial for one project is unlikely to be wholly
 applicable to another. The controller must guide and adapt the clan to a new
 project environment.
 argue that high performing teams go through the phases of
 orientation, trust building, goal clarification, commitment, and
 implementation. Finally, Jones (2008) argues that teams
 involved in enterprise systems must be built, equalized, struc-
 tured, and then tweaked.
 In all three team building models, social capital within the
 team is first developed, before the team is "guided" to
 perform its task. Tuckman' s model begins with individual-
 istic team members at the forming stage who engage in
 conflict resolution in the storming stage. It is only in the
 norming stage that team members begin adjusting to each
 others' behavior, and in the performing stage that the team
 can be trusted to achieve project goals. Similarly, in Drexler
 et al. 's model, social capital must be built by establishing
 meaning via trust building through orientation and relation-
 ships. It is only then that one can clarify goals and commit
 the team to implementation. Finally, in Jones' model, social
 capital must be built, and power differences between members
 must be equalized, before social capital can be used.
 Enacting Clan Control: Building the Clan
 Social capital is conceptualized as comprising three highly
 related dimensions (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998):
 • Structural : The structural dimension relates to overall
 patterns of connections among actors within a social
 network (i.e., who someone knows) and how the network
 of contacts is arranged. When networks are dense with
 a large proportion of strong and direct ties between
 members, social capital is high. The structural dimension
 refers not only to existing ties (Granovetter 1973) and
 linkage configurations, but also includes physical struc-
 tures that encourage or inhibit ties (Perrow 1986). For
 example, locations of congregational areas often influ-
 ence who one has ties with (Ko et al. 2005) and may
 affect the development of social capital.
 • Cognitive: The cognitive dimension refers to common-
 alities among individuals that provide shared represen-
 tations, interpretations, and systems of meaning (e.g.,
 common language or narratives) (Nahapiet and Ghoshal
 1998). For example, IT workers adopt words with par-
 ticular meanings like "bug," and RTFM. These provide
 a common vocabulary to discuss IT issues, and separate
 IT workers from other professionals.
 Relational : The relational dimension refers to the "close-
 ness" between members of a group. It goes beyond
 traditional team bonding activities like dinners, and
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 soccer games. Coleman (1988) argues for the importance
 of "multiplex" linkages - relationships where individuals
 share more than one context, for example, where project
 members are simultaneously friends or neighbors.
 The social capital perspective thus recognizes that beyond
 informal socialization mechanisms, structural and cognitive
 dimensions must be instituted to build the clan. For example,
 the structural dimension of social capital may be developed
 through thoughtful design of project reporting structures and
 work groups, as well as through the collocation of team mem-
 bers (Coleman 1988). In NIBCO's enterprise system imple-
 mentation, the work area was specifically designed to have no
 closed doors or private offices (Brown and Vessey 2001) to
 facilitate the building of structural ties. Cognitive ties may be
 developed through training that leads team members to view
 a project through a common methodological framework that
 emphasizes project deliverables (Rowe and Wright 1997).
 Moreover, one can accelerate the building of clan by
 reappropriating social capital from another context. Like
 other capital, social capital may be developed as an invest-
 ment for the future. In the same way, social capital required
 today need not be built from scratch. Bourdieu (1983) notes
 that social capital is "convertible." Coleman ( 1 988), similarly,
 discusses the "appropriable" social organization. Structural,
 cognitive, and relational ties may be reappropriated from one
 social setting to another (Arregle et al. 2007; Bolino et al.
 2002; Huntoon 2001). Such reappropriation of social capital
 is seen, for example, when a recruited executive brings a
 trusted management team from an old to a new organization.
 Enacting Clan Control: Leveraging the Clan
 Like any capital, embedded social capital is only rendered
 productive when applied to specific problem domains, for
 example, to reduce individuals' capacity for agency behavior
 (Fowler and Etchegary 2008; Nooteboom 2007; Oh et al.
 2006; Tansley and Newell 2007) or to facilitate coordination
 and knowledge sharing (Fowler and Etchegary 2008; Wasko
 and Faraj 2005).
 However, the literature has generally been silent about how a
 clan can be leveraged for specific outcomes. In the main,
 there is an implicit assumption that a clan's shared beliefs,
 values, and norms will automatically be aligned toward
 project goals. Extending the logic of leveraging, we suggest
 two ways a clan can be steered more proactively: (1) by
 reinforcing project- facilitating shared beliefs, values, and
 norms, and (2) by inhibiting beliefs, values, and norms that
 impede the achievement of project goals.
 In clans, values, beliefs, and norms are enforced through peer
 monitoring and peer sanction/reward (Arnott and Stiglitz
 1991; Barron and Gjerde 1997; Kandel and Lazear 1992;
 Kirsch 1997; Lave and Wenger 1991; Sewell 1998; Towry
 2003). A clan can be proactively leveraged to focus on pro-
 ject outcomes by influencing clan norms, values, and beliefs
 and interfering with the clan's monitoring and reward/
 sanction mechanisms.
 Project-facilitating shared beliefs, values, or norms in the clan
 may be reinforced in several ways. A controller could
 reframe or rearticulate the goals and vision of a project to
 appeal to existing beliefs or values built up in the clan (Kotter
 1996; Kotter and Cohen 2002), and demonstrate that the
 clan's shared goals would be fulfilled by striving toward
 project goals. Such alignment helps group members inter-
 nalize project goals quickly and act consistently to achieve
 project outcomes. These actions are often reflected in stra-
 tegic statements embracing such goals (e.g., memorandums of
 understanding, carefully crafted project vision and mission).
 Project- facilitating shared beliefs, values, and norms can be
 further reinforced by making them visible to the clan. Peer
 monitoring serves a dual purpose of monitoring for enforce-
 ment, and monitoring for learning (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991;
 Barron and Gjerde 1997; Bicchieri 2006; Lave and Wenger
 1991; Wenger 1998). Norms, values, and beliefs can be
 propagated via peers who mimic the individuals they monitor
 (Bicchieri 2006; Whiten et al. 2007). For example, a con-
 troller can reinforce project-facilitating beliefs, values, and
 norms by appointing respected or central individuals in the
 clan (e.g., opinion leaders) who support these beliefs, values,
 and norms to formal project team positions (Lave and Wenger
 1991; Wenger 1998).
 Leveraging the clan also involves inhibiting shared beliefs,
 values, or norms that impede project goals. Individuals mani-
 festing or propagating such beliefs, values, or norms can be
 isolated, reducing their access to project members and, hence,
 their influence in the clan (Feller et al. 2008; Lave and
 Wenger 1991). Punitive actions such as moving individual
 members to the periphery and public depreciating or shaming
 can suppress or discourage project-restraining beliefs, values,
 or norms (Jaworski 1988; Jaworski et al. 1993).
 The lens of social capital is thus useful in revealing con-
 ceptual insights on the enactment of clan control as a dual
 process of building and leveraging the clan. Unlike our tradi-
 tional understanding of clan control that narrowly emphasizes
 informal socialization to develop clan and expects clans to
 emerge slowly, organically, and often unpredictably overtime
 (Ouchi 1979; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983), the social capital lens
 injects pragmatism. It suggests the possibility of active facili-
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 tation in shaping and developing the structural, cognitive, and
 relational ties in social relationships and does not preclude the
 use of more expedient formal mechanisms to do so. Indeed,
 some (e.g., Evans 1996) argue formal authority or hierarchy
 can enable the building of social capital by providing "integ-
 rity" to the socialization process. Others suggest that formal
 authority is necessary for building social capital (Boss 2000).
 The use of formal mechanisms gives assurance that expected
 norms and reciprocity will be enforced and free riding will be
 kept in check. Extending the social capital perspective to the
 concept of clan control suggests that controllers may
 influence the enactment of clan control toward project goals.
 The following sections empirically examine these concepts.
 We explore a longitudinal case, a complex IT project which
 began with little clan control and was clearly foundering
 before steps were taken to increase clan control and bring the
 project back on track.
 Research Methodology
 Our research question of how clan control can be enacted in
 IT projects led to an exploratory longitudinal case study, a
 methodology considered appropriate for how, why, and what
 questions (Dubé and Paré 2003; Paré 2004). The longitudinal
 case study approach provided two key advantages. First, it
 allowed us to acquire a deep contextual understanding of the
 project that methodologies such as surveys do not provide
 (Yin 2003). Second, it allowed us to observe developments
 as project events unfolded, instead of relying on retrospective
 accounts (Dubé and Paré 2003). These advantages provided
 rich details about, and surfaced insights on the enactment of,
 clan control (Dyer and Wilkins 1991).
 Case Selection
 Our case sampling strategy involved intensity sampling (Paré
 2004), the selection of a case exemplifying the phenomenon
 being studied (clan control) (Dubé and Paré 2003). The case
 had several characteristics that fitted our research question.
 First, there was a clear need for clan control. This was parti-
 cularly true of the analysis and design phase where the task
 was more unstructured and novel, and outcome and behav-
 ioral controls alone would not have been adequate. This
 research examined the 14-months-long analysis and design
 phase of an enterprise package implementation across three
 highly autonomous business units (BUs) of a logistics com-
 pany. The project team designed a set of standardized pro-
 cesses to be implemented in a single enterprise package for
 the three BUs.
 The organization had never undertaken such an initiative
 before. The required knowledge and skills were distributed
 across BU representatives and vendor consultants. Clan
 control was needed to facilitate cooperation and knowledge
 exchange.
 Second, there was low social capital among team members at
 project initiation. The BUs had traditionally been autono-
 mous. The initial vendor consultants also had not worked
 with the organization previously. In addition, because the
 vendor was building up its manpower in the region, many
 consultants were new. Third, we had comprehensive access
 to project participants and documentation from project
 inception, which enabled us to observe how clan control was
 enacted.
 Site Description
 The company focuses on logistics (moving cargo across
 locations) and has three principal BUs, each dedicated to a
 particular transport mode: (1) air, (2) land, and (3) sea. The
 air BU operates a large fleet that includes jet, propeller, and
 rotor aircraft, and maintains facilities around the world to
 support them. The land BU specializes in off-road transport
 and supply, but also operates vehicles for passenger and cargo
 transport on traditional roadways. The sea BU maintains
 vessels capable of navigation in both coastal and deep waters.
 The new system was to replace aging logistics management
 systems in the BUs, as well as integrate their logistics pro-
 cesses. Previously, each BU operated its own individual
 logistics management system. The company wanted to more
 closely integrate its logistics processes, comprising engi-
 neering and maintenance, supply management, and logistics-
 related finance, both across and within the BUs.
 The project had three principal stakeholder groups.
 • Corporate management, whose representatives - the cor-
 porate vice president (VP), assistant vice president
 (A VP) of logistics, and the corporate IT director - were
 the controllers responsible for ensuring that the project
 met organizational objectives. Positioning the three
 senior-most project representatives, who had the highest
 project authority, as controllers is consistent with the
 prior IT literature (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch
 2004; Mahaney and Lederer 2003; Mähring 2002;
 Nidumolu and Subramani 2003/2004). Controllers were
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 supported by staff from the corporate office and IT divi-
 sion that facilitated meetings, liaised with vendors and
 BU representatives, created project management docu-
 ments, took minutes, and performed other support
 functions.
 • The vendors (comprising managers and consultants from
 the primary vendor and subcontractor) were responsible
 for the design and implementation of the enterprise
 system. The vendors had about 50 employees on site.
 • BU representatives (from the three BUs), who were
 subject matter experts, provided input to the requirements
 and design, and accepted the resultant standardized
 design. The BUs had about 50 employees on site.
 Figure 1 presents an organizational chart depicting the various
 stakeholders and their formal relationships as controllers
 (corporate management) and controllees (i.e., user repre-
 sentatives and vendor consultants).
 Data Collection
 We were invited by the corporate IT division to observe the
 project and develop case reports for the internal training of
 project managers. Consistent with case study best practices,
 we obtained data from multiple sources (Eisenhardt 1989b;
 Paré 2004; Yin 2003) such as written project documentation
 including contracts, milestone review presentations and
 minutes of meetings, and interviews with project participants.
 We visited the site every six weeks, from project inception in
 January 2003 to the end of the analysis and design phase in
 April 2004. We continued to visit the site regularly to April
 2005, when the system was successfully implemented in the
 first BU.
 We developed an interview protocol and adapted it to reflect
 changes in issues as the project progressed. Prior to the inter-
 view, we reviewed the most recent project documentation and
 prior interviews, and discussed issues we needed to raise with
 interviewees. Interview questions focused on issues of pro-
 ject management. In the initial interviews, interviewees were
 asked about their role in the project, the tasks in which they
 were involved, and the deliverables for which they were
 responsible. We asked interviewees to recount their specific
 experiences in the project, focusing on problems, issues, how
 they or others interacted, and steps taken to resolve problems.
 We then asked for interviewees' perceptions of project suc-
 cess and project control. We closed interviews by asking for
 recommendations for additional interview subjects. Such
 snowball sampling is typical in exploratory research (Kuzel
 1992).
 We conducted 79 interviews. Table 1 summarizes the
 breakdown of interviews.
 Most interviews were at least an hour long. During inter-
 views, at least two, and more commonly three, researchers
 were on hand to take notes. Interviewers adopted a special-
 ized role strategy (Dubé and Paré 2003; Eisenhardt 1989b).
 One interviewer was the primary interviewer, who asked the
 majority of questions, took fewer notes, and focused on main-
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 Stakeholder # of Interviews # of Distinct Interviewees
 Corporate Management 18* 3
 VP Logistics 4 1
 AVP Logistics 7 1
 Corporate IT Director 1 1 1
 Corporate Support Staff 18 10
 Logistics 12 7
 IT ~ 6 3
 Sea BU Representatives 7 4
 Land BU Representatives 2 2
 Air BU Representatives 5 3
 Primary vendor 16 13
 Manager 4 2
 Consultants 12 11
 Subcontractor 13 6
 Manager 6 1
 Consultants 7 5
 Total 79 41
 *The number of interviews with each controller adds up to more than 18 because some interviews were con-
 ducted with two or more controllers.
 taining eye contact with interviewees. The other two inter-
 viewers attempted to take verbatim notes. A tape recorder
 was not used, as interviewees were more comfortable without
 one. To ensure interview quality was not compromised by
 fatigue, no more than three interviews were conducted per
 day. Interview notes from all researchers were consolidated
 and typed within 24 hours by a researcher present at the
 interview. Field notes were also taken to record observations
 (e.g., physical office arrangement, informal notices pasted
 along hallway) (Paré 2004).
 Analysis
 We first sought to build an overall understanding of the case.
 We created a sequential time line of major activities, issues,
 and actions taken by corporate managers, consultants, and BU
 representatives, and the project performance at each phase of
 the project.
 The time line was structured in the form of the challenge,
 tactics, and resolution phases suggested by Paré (2004). The
 challenge phase occurred during the first five months, where
 problems quickly surfaced, the project foundered, and the
 primary vendor's senior manager abruptly left. Tactics to
 address challenges, mainly by enacting clan control, occurred
 principally over the next three months. It was evident during
 the last six months (resolution) that the problems were being
 resolved, as improvements to performance were clearly
 observable.
 These project phases, key events and actions, and perfor-
 mance, were validated through a detailed, 70-page case sub-
 mitted to the organization. Multiple individuals provided
 detailed comments which we incorporated into findings (Dubé
 and Paré 2003; Mason 1996).
 We were initially interested in identifying the control port-
 folio in this complex project and how it evolved over time.
 We therefore sought to code control mechanisms used, and
 classify them by control modes based on previous classi-
 fications in the literature. We regularly discussed and refined
 coding, paying special attention to how evidence fitted into
 the overall project context (Miles and Huberman 1994). The
 three members involved in fieldwork drew on our under-
 standing of the project in discussing coding, while the fourth
 team member provided an independent perspective to
 challenge possible coding biases (Adler and Adler 1988).
 Our initial findings revealed that a number of controls were
 added in the "tactics" phase. This led us to characterize the
 set of controls that were implemented at the start of the
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 project as the initial portfolio of controls, and the set that
 included the additional controls as the revamped portfolio of
 controls. We also discovered that the revamped portfolio of
 controls employed substantially more clan control. We found
 this significant, and began to explore in greater detail how
 clan control was developed in the complex project.
 At this point, we shared our preliminary findings at a research
 workshop, where participants noted that social capital theory
 might be useful for exploring clan control. We found that,
 indeed, the structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions of
 social capital were helpful in interpreting data. Furthermore,
 when we combined social capital theory with our under-
 standing of the two research streams on clan control (building
 the clan and leveraging the clan), we realized that mech-
 anisms that developed structural, cognitive, and relational ties
 among project team members contributed to building the clan,
 while mechanisms that relied on the existence of norms,
 values, and beliefs of the group were leveraging the clan.
 We developed coding guidelines for building social capital
 based on definitions of structural, cognitive, and relational
 dimensions in the social capital literature (see Table 2), and
 recoded data. Actions that build structural ties facilitate team
 members knowing each other. For example, the vendor pro-
 posed the expansion of communal workspace and having
 consultants and BU representatives sit together. We also con-
 sidered whom interview subjects knew, the underlying
 structure that made them meet, interact, and communicate
 with one another (e.g., accountability structure, task grouping,
 and physical layout). For cognitive ties, we considered the
 extent various stakeholders (corporate management, BUs, and
 vendor consultants) were different or similar in terms of their
 profiles and perspectives. We checked whether stakeholders
 had prior related or common experiences (e.g., consultants
 who previously worked in the logistics industry, BU represen-
 tatives who previously worked on process standardization
 projects). Actions that build cognitive ties improve common-
 ality in experiences and world view. For example, controllers
 wanted all team members to use a common process modeling
 approach and access a common project database. Actions to
 build relational ties increase the breadth and depth of
 interaction. We looked for evidence of informal socialization
 and bonding activities outside the work context. For example,
 the AVP Logistics held karaoke sessions after work.
 The dimensions of social capital are not orthogonal (Nahapiet
 and Ghoshal 1998). An action that builds structural ties may
 also support the building of cognitive and relational ties. In
 presenting actions for building social capital, we only high-
 light the mechanisms most directly related to a specific
 dimension for ease of explication.
 We theorized that controllers leveraged the clan by rein-
 forcing or inhibiting shared norms, values, and beliefs and
 reflected this in our coding guidelines. This required us to
 identify clan norms and values that emerged as social capital
 was developed. As they were more difficult to identify (being
 omnipresent and largely invisible), we looked for changes in
 group behaviors aligned with the achievement of project
 outcomes, before and after actions by controllers to build the
 clan. One example is the change in behavior away from the
 BU-centric perspective toward an enterprise perspective. Our
 interviews during the challenge phase and site observations
 surfaced comments about BU-centric behaviors. Interviews
 and observations during the resolution phase showed project
 team members were changing behavior, as noted in their
 greater willingness to accommodate each other. For example,
 BU representatives were now more concerned about meeting
 project requirements than focusing only on the requirements
 of their BU (e.g., " nobody defends his own users We iden-
 tified a number of controller actions that reinforced this new
 clan norm (see Table 4).
 Project performance throughout the three phases was also
 assessed. Concrete evidence was gathered in the form of
 interim and final deliverables, achieved deadlines and objec-
 tives, actual and budgeted figures, and interviewees' percep-
 tions of the quality of the analysis and design. For example,
 evidence of poor interim project performance was noted as
 interviewees talked about missing interim deliverables and
 their perception of problems (e.g., lack of communication
 between certain parties, inability to come to agreement on
 processes).
 Results
 This section details the case using the challenge, tactic, and
 resolution structure suggested by Paré (2004). In challenge,
 we highlight problems associated with the project team and
 poor project performance. In tactics, we analyze steps taken
 to create structural, cognitive, and relational ties among team
 members that facilitated the building of the clan in the project.
 We then describe how the clan's emergent shared beliefs,
 values, and norms were leveraged to achieve project goals. In
 resolution, we describe how the project was completed
 successfully.
 Challenge: Poor Project Performance
 Initially, management relied on a portfolio of controls heavily
 weighted toward formal control. Behavior control mecha-
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 Coded Construct Observation Illustrative Quote
 Build structural Action by controller which helps people Collocate Users and Consultants : "[Users] have been
 ties across stakeholder groups to see, seconded to [vendor] to handle [confidential] items and
 interact or develop a shared context after implementation , to do the Application Maintenance"
 with each other (vendor consultant in commenting on controller's action).
 Build cognitive ties Action by controller which creates Build Core "Backbone" Scenarios: "Users have quite
 common representations, similar ideas on what backbone scenarios are" (corporate
 interpretations, and systems of shared support).
 meaning across stakeholder groups
 Build relational Action by controller which creates Build Relationship: "Management of relationships with all
 ties bonds across stakeholder groups parties , especially with complex projects like this where
 scope management is important" (vendor consultant in
 stressing what the controller had done right).
 Reappropriating Action by controller to reappropriate Bring in Subcontractor Consultants: "[Subcontractor] has
 existing social social capital from another context done more than you were supposed to do for this [project].
 capital You guys were only supposed to shadow the [requirements
 phase], but you took on project leads , scenario
 leads. . .. Without this bunch of people, the project would not
 have turned around and come to this stage" (minutes of
 meeting where VP publicly thanked contractors).
 Reinforcing norms Action by controller to encourage Joint Accountability: "There's 120 scenarios, each with 2
 specific group behaviors (traceable to owners, 1 user, 1 consultant... if something's not working,
 shared norms, beliefs, or values) which we tell both to get it done" (primary vendor manager).
 help project to succeed
 Inhibiting norms Action by controller to discourage group Strict Enforcement of Scenario Delivery Deadlines: "Two
 behaviors (traceable to shared norms, points to emphasize... 2) management of completion of
 beliefs, or values) which are hindering local design deliverables and preparation for smooth sign-
 project off' (minutes of meeting emphasizing that corporate
 management wanted users to sign off by deadline and not
 dispute the design).
 Emergent Clan Observed by the change in the Being "One Team": "There's ownership... also the people
 Norms, Values behaviors of project group members on the ground are working together has helped things too. "
 and Beliefs that show the development of shared (corporate IT director)
 norms, beliefs, or values, that are
 aligned with the achievement of project
 outcomes.
 Project Indications that the project is successful Process Standardization Target: "in [process modeling
 Performance in terms of deliverables, budget, time database], 90% is the same, but adding the out of scope
 line, and expected business outcomes scenarios will mean a lower figure" (subcontractor
 manager).
 nanisms included a standard development methodology, docu-
 mentation procedures, and quality assurance audits; outcome
 control mechanisms included specification of project deliver-
 ables, budget, time line, and a 60 percent target level of stan-
 dardization. Few clan control mechanisms were observed
 during the challenge phase. One was an informal memoran-
 dum of understanding signed between the logistics organiza-
 tion and the primary vendor. This document was noncontrac-
 tual; its intent was to promote a strategic partnership between
 the two organizations. Another was the project kick-off cere-
 mony attended by senior representatives from all stakeholder
 groups, where the CEO of the company made a speech
 emphasizing the importance of the project to the company's
 long-term competitiveness. As we explain in the discussion
 section, these initiatives in leveraging the clan were pre-
 mature, as they incorrectly presumed the existence of a clan.
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 There was little social capital. Structurally and relationally,
 representatives from the three BUs did not know each other.
 The consultants from the primary vendor also had not worked
 with the organization before. The physical layout of the
 project site was such that each stakeholder group had its own
 room, and there was little interaction except in formal forums
 such as requirements meetings. Cognitively, the three BUs
 operated autonomously and evolved distinctive norms and
 identities. This was reinforced by the norm of each BU
 having uniforms of a different color. They also dealt with
 different types of logistics equipment, and used separate
 logistics terms. Air BU personnel were better educated and
 more concerned about aircraft reliability. The land BU was
 more concerned about supply, and having simpler, robust
 processes given their larger number of personnel and high
 turnover. There was also little shared cognition with vendor
 consultants. The vendor, while well-established internation-
 ally, had just set up its Asian consulting arm, which recruited
 new consultants globally for the project. Consultants were
 conversant with the technology, but some were unfamiliar
 with the Asian context, the business practices in the logistics
 industry, or the client organization's culture and work
 practices. A consultant noted that
 There were language problems. The consultants are
 from around the world, so we have different writing
 styles and focus. This made synchronization diffi-
 cult. Some follow the work norms in their home
 countries. They take time to adjust their pace of
 work here.
 There were differences in norms, values, and beliefs across
 stakeholders. For example, BU members and consultants held
 different norms and beliefs about each other's roles, and the
 level of collaboration expected in the project. BU members
 stated that it was the consultants' job to come up with the
 design, and this was displayed by their behavior: they drew
 boundaries between what they perceived was their work and
 what they felt was consultants' work. Consultants expected
 BU members to be more proactive in providing inputs to the
 design.
 There were also differences in the values and beliefs
 regarding the goals of the project. Corporate management
 and consultants saw standardization of BU processes and data
 as a key project objective. BU representatives were generally
 skeptical about this goal, as they looked at the project more
 from the perspective of their respective BUs.
 Instead of simple harmonization, they [corporate]
 want to do standardization. I see this as overkill !
 We only need to do so if the benefits exist.
 This difference in beliefs about what the key goal of the pro-
 ject should be was reflected in BU representatives' behaviors.
 The BUs often could not reconcile their conflicting business
 processes, and would "agree to disagree." Consultants com-
 plained about this conflict among representatives from
 different BUs:
 If you satisfy any one [BU's] requirements , there
 are problems with the other [BUs].
 Hence, despite the many formal control mechanisms, the pro-
 ject quickly foundered. The team struggled with incompatible
 requirements. BU representatives had trouble agreeing with
 each other, and the relationship between BU representatives
 and the primary vendor was strained. Vendor consultants
 were frustrated as BU representatives could not arrive at a
 single set of requirements, while BU representatives casti-
 gated vendor consultants for being unable to provide best
 practices. Thirteen vendor consultants left after the initial
 months. The first few milestones were missed. Deliverables
 were poor and inconsistent. A senior cross-functional team,
 formed to audit the interim deliverables, found other problems
 such as poor integration in the design across functional areas.
 In the midst of these problems, the original primary vendor
 manager abruptly left, alerting controllers to the severity of
 problems and the need to take drastic action to develop tighter
 cohesion among BU representatives and vendor consultants.
 Over the next three months, a slew of management actions
 were introduced, leading to the quick enactment of clan
 control, and the project began to turn around.
 Tactic: Building the Clan
 Table 3 summarizes various actions taken to build the clan by
 developing its social capital dimensions (structural, cognitive,
 and relational ties) and reappropriating existing social capital.
 Building Structural Ties
 Work organization reoriented around scenarios instead of
 tracks: Initially, team members were focused on one of three
 tracks - financial control, engineering management, and
 supply management - and " there was no forum to discuss
 cr ss-track issues " (corporate support). In addition, each BU
 favored a track. The air BU was most invested in engineering
 management, because aircraft components like engines
 required extensive engineering maintenance. The land BU
 closely watched supply management, because land vehicles
 are supplied irregularly at multiple sites such as gas stations.
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 Building the Clan Actions Taken
 Building Structural Ties • Work organization reoriented around scenarios instead of tracks
 Seating structure changed
 Communal eating facilities introduced
 Building Cognitive Ties • New vendor project manager who appreciated and understood local context
 recruited
 Common modeling language introduced
 Building Relational Ties • New vendor project manager carpooled with corporate project manager (i.e.,
 AVP Logistics)
 Issue airing workshops introduced
 Socialization functions such as soccer games, karaoke, and dinners introduced
 Management demonstrated solidarity by banning own long vacation leave
 Reappropriating Social Capital • Import of social capital through a bigger team of subcontractor consultants
 Airplanes and ships, on the other hand, are provided supplies
 at fixed ports on a prearranged basis. The track structure
 encouraged BU representatives to affiliate with their own BU.
 The separation of tracks into individual rooms also inhibited
 cross-track interaction and information sharing.
 Taking a suggestion from the new primary vendor manager,
 the AVP Logistics reconfigured the project work structure.
 Business processes from the tracks were combined into
 scenarios such that each scenario detailed a situation from
 inception to completion. Scenarios were overlaid on the
 existing track structure. An example scenario might involve
 a vehicle breakdown. To correctly model the repair process
 end-to-end, the team would have to learn the processes for
 supply management (for parts to replace defects), financial
 control (for money to obtain parts), and engineering manage-
 ment (to perform the replacement). The scenario structure
 brought members from different tracks together. Because
 user representatives had to gather requirements for the
 scenario, which crossed functional tracks and BUs, they had
 to interact with other stakeholders and understand their issues.
 Engineering management, for example, could not just resolve
 issues specific to the track and ignore problems in other
 tracks.
 The scenario approach helped to resolve cross-track
 issues , since scenarios go across tracks. Scenarios
 can be used to break barriers between tracks and fill
 in the gaps/black boxes in the processes. (User
 Representative)
 Seating structure changed: Initially, each track was housed
 in a different room. The primary vendor manager felt tracks
 should sit together. The subcontractor agreed, and arranged
 for the AVP Logistics to visit one of the subcontractor's other
 sites with a collocated large project team to show how col-
 location helped projects move forward. The AVP Logistics
 then authorized extensive renovations to the office environ-
 ment. Rooms were refurbished and, more importantly, walls
 separating various rooms were knocked down; stakeholders
 from different groups were required to work together in the
 same open office.
 I recommended all tracks to be in one big room. I
 wanted to change peoples ' thinking that they belong
 to just one track and soften team boundaries.
 Actually I would like to see everyone as one big
 resource pool. (Primary Vendor Manager)
 Furthermore, seating in the refurbished office was reassigned.
 The BU representatives and vendor consultants responsible
 for each scenario were assigned seats next to each other. As
 scenarios were cross-track, this meant BU representatives
 from the different BUs were dispersed, rather than aggre-
 gating in different sections of a single room.
 Communal eating facilities introduced: The project work-
 place was a remote building in a difficult-to-access location.
 Initial structural design focused on creating office space to
 house different stakeholder groups. There was no conscious
 design of communal or congregational space. For example,
 there were no food outlets. Workers either packed food from
 home or left the facility to eat. This meant workers tended to
 eat with preestablished cliques. The AVP Logistics made
 proactive arrangements to create congregational spaces
 centered around food. For example, a mobile food van was
 invited in at lunchtime. Arrangements were also made for a
 nearby office to open its cafeteria to project team members.
 The provision of accessible communal food areas increased
 interaction and recognition among individuals across tracks.
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 As a result, BU representatives and vendor consultants across
 tracks began seeing more of each other and got to know more
 team members. A user representative noted that knowing
 more people " really helped with the dialogues and discus-
 sions.
 Building Cognitive Ties
 New vendor project manager who appreciated and under-
 stood local context recruited: The sudden resignation of the
 primary vendor manager provided an opportunity for cor-
 porate management to realign social dynamics within the
 project team. Learning from its earlier experience, corporate
 management realized the importance of a vendor manager
 who appreciated the company's organizational, industry, and
 country contexts. Unlike the earlier appointment, this
 screening and interview process was conducted by both the
 vendor and corporate management, who emphasized "ability
 to fit" in the hiring interview.
 I interviewed [new primary vendor project
 manager] for two or three hours to make sure that
 he is the right fit. I'm confident. He has relevant
 experience , plus strong local ties. He 's married to
 a local and has been living here for 15 years. (A VP
 Logistics)
 Common modeling language introduced: One source of
 dispute across BUs was the choice of process modeling
 notation they should use. Initially, the supply management
 track (dominated by the land BU) insisted on a process
 modeling notation optimized for supply chain management.
 The other tracks wanted a more generic notation. Work on
 the supply management track was initiated in the specialized
 notation, while work in the other tracks was done in the more
 generic one. This inconsistent use of modeling notation led
 to frustration as processes done in the supply management
 track could not be readily integrated with the other two tracks.
 I know both notations and know they can 't be used
 together , but [land B.U.J insisted on using the
 [specialized notation] on supply, while the other
 [BUs] went ahead to use the [generic notation].
 [Old primary vendor project manager] didn't
 object. He gave in to the [BUs]. It led to subse-
 quent problems. There's no integration between
 supply and the rest. (Corporate Support)
 On the advice of the new primary vendor manager, corporate
 management mandated the adoption of a new single process
 modeling notation that project members were not familiar
 with. The choice of this new, unfamiliar notation and tool
 was made despite the presence of viable alternatives. For
 example, corporate management could have insisted that
 supply management adopt the tool and notation employed by
 the other two tracks. Adoption was initially painful as every-
 one had to be trained on the new tool. However, a single
 process modeling tool provided a common language through
 which project team members would interact henceforth.
 Team members attended training sessions hosted by the tool
 vendor, and learned to use the tool vendor's process terms at
 those sessions. Furthermore, everyone could refer to a com-
 mon modeling database to see how each process would relate
 to processes in other tracks. People could check the progress
 of scenarios across the project in a consistent manner as the
 project took shape. The new tool also put everyone on equal
 footing, as most project team members (including consultants)
 had no experience with the tool.
 Building Relational Ties
 New vendor project manager carpooled with A VP Logis-
 tics: The new vendor project manager happened to reside in
 the same neighborhood as the AVP Logistics. The AVP
 Logistics took the opportunity to "multiplex" their relation-
 ship as colleagues and neighbors by offering to carpool. The
 two men came to work together in the AVP Logistics' car
 every morning. Such informal communication channels
 enabled them to know each other better, and encouraged an
 open and friendly discussion of various issues that arose in the
 project.
 The 30-minute or so drive was good. We talked ' we
 chatted, and before we reached the project site, we
 would often strategize and decide what were the key
 things we needed to resolve today. (AVP Logistics)
 Issue airing workshops introduced: Relational barriers, for
 example, perceived inequity among members (Wilkins and
 Ouchi 1983), were also removed. To address initial mistrust,
 the subcontractor, with the agreement of the AVP Logistics
 and the primary vendor, organized "grievance airing" work-
 shops. Stakeholders from various groups could come to these
 workshops to express concerns. Corporate management
 supported workshops by their active participation, and by
 signaling that concerns would be taken seriously and
 addressed. Issues from workshops were put on paper and
 mounted on the wall. As solutions were identified, they were
 put on paper next to the issues. Rectified issues were marked.
 Once all issues on the displayed paper were rectified, the
 paper was removed.
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 We had team workshops for all levels , including
 management, team leads , [BU personnel] . It was
 very open. It showed all feelings. Some people were
 very apprehensive before but they became more
 positive later. I also had team lunches with every
 team to thrash out issues. There was user resis-
 tance. I had to mediate between them to increase
 the level of trust. (Subcontractor Manager)
 Socialization functions such as soccer games, karaoke, and
 dinners introduced: To foster team relationships, the
 energetic and sociable AVP Logistics began encouraging
 participation in group activities. He got people to socialize
 not just in a formal work context but also in informal "play"
 settings. Recreational functions he organized included dinner
 sessions at posh restaurants to celebrate milestones achieved,
 soccer games, and karaoke sessions.
 We learnt to karaoke. We 'd meet several times a
 day , orchestrate, and after 5 p.m. go for drinks. I
 play soccer with them and remind them to keep fit,
 because the project is a long journey and people are
 maxed out. (AVP Logistics)
 Management demonstrated solidarity by banning own
 long vacation leave: Corporate management also banned
 long vacation leave. Long leave would only be allowed when
 the project was on schedule. However, corporate manage-
 ment did not exempt themselves from the ban and did not take
 long leave while the project was in trouble. Thus, corporate
 management projected an image of solidarity. Everyone in
 the project team was to suffer together, and no one (including
 the controllers) was to take leave at the expense of others.
 Reappropriating Social Capital
 Import of social capital through a bigger team of sub-
 contractor consultants: Given the tight project schedule,
 corporate management sought to bring in a bigger team of
 subcontractor consultants who were more familiar with the
 local context. Thus, social capital was also imported into the
 project team. These new consultants were stamped with the
 subcontractor's work norms (e.g., professionalism, strong task
 orientation); recall that the vendor's consultants were new to
 the vendor organization and the country and did not have a
 common work culture. In addition, some subcontractor
 consultants had worked either with the organization or other
 local companies previously. They were better able to relate
 to BU representatives because of their familiarity with the
 logistics industry and local context. The strategy here was to
 bring in a critical mass of subcontractor consultants so that
 their social capital could be used for the project.
 [Subcontractor] was subcontracted for the build
 phase, but the contract required them to put some
 people in the [design] phase.... [Corporate] wants
 people who have done similar work for respectable
 [logistics companies], some degree of cultural sensi-
 tivity, because [corporate] knows that some of its
 people aren't easy to work with. (Vendor
 Consultant)
 Corporate management wanted more subcontractor consul-
 tants despite some concerns with their technical skills. Some
 subcontractor consultants were new to enterprise systems
 configuration.
 [Subcontractor, there 's] some concerns about their
 skill set. It is seen as part of the learning curve.
 Some are very green, and new to [enterprise
 systems], some were doing [enterprise systems]
 configuration for the first time. (Corporate IT
 Director)
 The intentional replacement strategy led to subcontractor
 consultants eventually accounting for about half the vendor
 personnel.
 It's more [subcontractor], less [primary vendor
 now]. The team leads are all [subcontractor].
 (Corporate IT Director)
 The infusion of these consultants not only brought a higher
 degree of shared cognition with BU representatives, but also
 facilitated the growth of productive consulting work norms.
 Tactic: Leveraging the Clan
 The above actions built the clan through the building of social
 capital among team members. As social capital was built, the
 project team began to develop new beliefs, values, and norms.
 We observed controllers employing a distinct set of actions to
 translate these relatively high-level and undirected shared
 values, beliefs, and norms into the specific project context.
 Relevant values or norms useful to project outcomes were
 reinforced while undesirable ones were inhibited. Table 4
 lists leveraging actions taken by controllers.
 From leaving on time to working late: During the initial
 project phases, the project norm was that controllees would
 leave the project site at the end of the official work day.
 Working late was not a part of the logistics organization's
 corporate culture. Most of the primary vendor consultants
 had been recently recruited from all over the world for this
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 ■
 Clan Values and Controller Action to Influence Clan
 Norms Values and Norms Clan Monitoring and Enforcement
 Staying late at • Appoint subcontractor consultants as Primary vendor consultants and BU members observe
 work to meet track leads, increasing visibility of their and emulate subcontractor consultants' "work late"
 deadlines behaviors (reinforce) behavior. Social capital increases visibility of "work
 • Delay server backup to remove impedi- late" behavior, and sense of mutual support.
 ment to emerging norm (reinforce)
 Having an • Institute peer voting system (reinforce) BU team members now have a mechanism by which
 enterprise they could negotiate with each other, and make trade-
 perspective offs. Social capital facilitates effective reciprocation
 amongst team members.
 • Designate joint user-consultant BU team members are accountable for the assigned
 accountability for scenario (reinforce) scenario across all BUs, and spend more time on
 understanding other BU's requirements to design a
 common solution. They also see consultants as
 partners. Social capital increases ability to interact
 effectively with other BU team members and
 consultants.
 • Strict enforcement of scenario delivery Clear accountability empowers team members. This,
 deadlines (inhibit) together with tight deadlines, weakens the previous
 practice of frequently seeking approval from BU
 management. Social capital increases commitment to
 the project.
 Being "one team" • Controller and vendor project manager The client-vendor distinction is less emphasized.
 use informal chat sessions to strategize Social capital facilitates BU team members and
 and to speak with one voice (reinforce) consultants give-and-take.
 • Removing uncooperative consultants Corporate management, through active engagement
 (inhibit) with project team members, can identify and remove
 uncooperative consultants.
 project, and the vendor did not have time to socialize them to
 its organizational culture. When brought into the work site,
 they imitated the culture of the BU and corporate members.
 When the VP Logistics brought in the subcontractor team
 (importing social capital into the project), the subcontractor
 team brought with them their norm of working late to meet
 deadlines. When primary vendor track leads were replaced
 with subcontractor track leads, the "work late" norm became
 highly visible to primary vendor consultants and BU
 members.
 Primary vendor consultants knew the subcontractor had
 increased in favor, and that subcontractor team members were
 moving into positions of prominence. Primary vendor consul-
 tants began emulating subcontractor consultants and stayed
 ate. BU and corporate members could see the consultants
 work late, and also emulated their behavior.
 For the first time , some people started working late ,
 they started working together. For the first time,
 there's the smell of success. (Primary Vendor
 Manager)
 One impediment to the late work was the server backup time.
 When the project norms were to leave at the end of the
 official work day, the server backup was timed to initiate at
 the end of the work day. This tended to cause computers to
 freeze. Corporate management arranged for a later backup,
 thus removing an impediment to the promulgation of the
 "work late" norm.
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 People are working 'til 8 or 9 p.m. ! I ashed for the
 server backup to be delayed to midnight. (A VP
 Logistics)
 From BU-centric to enterprise perspective: Initially, BU
 members were highly BU centric. The affiliation to corporate
 management was not strong. Reinforcing the initial BU-
 centric focus was the practice of BU project members
 referring back to their senior executives at the BU when
 changes were required during analysis and design.
 There was no empowerment. They have to check
 with the boss, and get back to the [project] every
 time. (Vendor Consultant)
 Several clan building actions, such as grouping team members
 by scenarios that cut across tracks and BUs, and having all
 team members learn and use a common process modeling
 language and tool, helped BU team members understand the
 processes and requirements of other BUs and to appreciate the
 bigger, enterprise-wide picture.
 Many people are only understanding now why the
 project is important; it's not only about trans-
 actional efficiency , but the project has strategic
 value.... It began with the [BUs] wanting to change
 because their system was old. . . now it 's all changed.
 Someone said that if they truly have the system ,
 they 'II be able to know how much it costs to run a
 [fleet] of aircraft... how much it costs to support
 [various aircraft-related activities] including non-
 visible costs.... It's the power of information!
 (Corporate Support)
 This emergent enterprise-wide perspective was further
 encouraged when corporate management introduced a peer
 voting system. Process design variations from the different
 scenarios were identified, and BU representatives would
 review and vote on them. A process that received support
 from at least two BUs was coded as "blue," which meant
 corporate management would pay for its implementation. A
 process that received only one vote would be coded as "pink,"
 which meant the cost of implementing the process would
 come from the BU's budget.
 The peer voting system encouraged a shared enterprise orien-
 tation. It reinforced peer rewards and sanctions by estab-
 lishing formal outcomes with direct business consequences.
 Because prior cross-BU contact was minimal, and BU
 members were mainly rewarded for within-BU contributions,
 BU members only had limited ability to socially sanction a
 deviating BU member. With voting, however, people per-
 forming the voting would see each other on successive
 occasions to vote on new processes. Thus, BU A would be
 more willing to accommodate a noncritical process from BU
 B with the trust that BU B would reciprocate by agreeing on
 the design of a critical process of BU A that was not critical
 to BU B.
 People were initially unwilling to change their
 processes to benefit another [BU]. In such situa-
 tions , [corporate] asked them to choose. If two
 [BUs] agree, then it 's a blue box and the other [BU]
 will be a pink box. ... Now there 's greater readiness
 to let go of their less critical requirements. (User
 Representative)
 With the peer voting system, there was no need for arbitration
 by corporate management. BUs monitored and sanctioned
 each other. The system provided a formal platform to con-
 cretize peer sanctions, such that noncooperative behaviors
 were "punished," thus reinforcing peer norms toward conver-
 gence. The peer voting process propelled the project forward
 by fostering consensus among the BUs that eventually saw
 greater than 80 percent standardization.
 Corporate management also changed the project account-
 ability structure. Previously, the vendor consultants, as track
 leads, were responsible for getting processes standardized and
 issues resolved. With the change toward the scenario ap-
 proach, corporate management took the opportunity to make
 consultants and user representatives jointly responsible to
 deliver a scenario.
 So now all three are involved, [corporate IT],
 [consultant], and user, have to sign off on all
 documents. (Corporate IT Director)
 The BU member responsible for a scenario thus had to work
 closely with a consultant and a member of corporate IT. The
 BU member had to get requirements across the BUs, and thus
 spent less time interacting with his own BU.
 Now with the scenarios approach, the users are
 being shared across tracks. (Primary Vendor
 Consultant)
 Furthermore, each scenario was to be completed by a dead-
 line. Thus, going back to the BU for approval was something
 that became a luxury.
 At the beginning, everyone wanted their questions
 answered. Now, there are strict time lines and
 accountability. Scenario owners have a deadline for
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 decisions; if they can 't make it, then it will escalate
 [to corporate]. (Corporate Support)
 Joint accountability changed norms by disrupting and
 reforming peer monitoring networks. The BU member in
 charge of a scenario interacted more with other BU members,
 and less with his own BU. Because he was not solely
 responsible for signing off on a scenario, his individual
 accountability was lessened, reducing the possibility of BU-
 specific sanctions.
 The user sits with the consultant to make sure that if
 the scenario doesn 't go through , then both are to
 blame. (Vendor Subcontractor Manager)
 The joint accountability converted the sense of camaraderie
 into real work efforts that accelerated project progress.
 Members cooperated and willingly tapped the appropriate
 user representative and/or consultant network to resolve a
 process or technical issue. The trust and respect developed
 between BU representatives and vendors translated into "give
 and take" in facilitating user representative sign-offs. The
 norms of cooperation and joint destiny were institutionalized,
 as BU representatives and vendors embraced each others'
 interests.
 From identifying only with own stakeholder group to
 being one team: When the project first began, the BU
 members drew boundaries between what they perceived was
 their work and what they felt was consultants' work. For
 example, BU members frequently stated that it was the
 consultants' job to come up with the design. This led to a
 lack of pro-activeness and ownership by the BU members
 with regard to the design of the new system.
 Users are very vocal , but they 're not actual doers.
 (Consultant)
 Several clan-building actions were helpful in realigning BU
 members and consultants from their respective groups to the
 project team. For example, the soccer games, karaoke
 sessions, and dinners helped both users and consultants
 interact in informal, nonwork settings. Subsequent steps were
 taken to increase the sense of shared destiny, joint respon-
 sibility for and commitment to project success.
 The designation of joint user-consultant accountability for
 scenarios was one such measure. The AVP Logistics also
 cleverly used the relationships he developed with the vendor
 manager as both colleague and neighbor. The casual chats
 during the car rides were converted into informal strategizing
 sessions. These were proactive efforts to direct social capital
 toward positive project outcomes; such casual chats could
 have steered clear of work-related matters. The consequence
 was the AVP Logistics and vendor manager spoke about
 project issues with a consistent voice, sending a clear signal
 from the top. While shared vision is generally important in
 projects, it was especially salient here, because of a strong
 norm of respect for authority in the organization and local
 culture. Once senior management articulated the vision of
 standardization with a joint and consistent voice, all groups
 worked toward a common objective. For example, users
 stopped blaming consultants for substandard documentation.
 Instead, as a user representative noted, " Users began
 amending the documents for the consultants ."
 The shared norms of being "one team" had to be carefully
 guarded and sustained. As the norm emerged, project team
 members became less tolerant of the handful of consultants
 perceived as being poor team players. BU members sanc-
 tioned such consultants by providing negative feedback about
 them to corporate management. Corporate management
 alerted vendor managers about these uncooperative consul-
 tants, and the vendor counseled and removed them when
 necessary. These stern actions upheld the norms of being
 cooperative, and one team.
 Some consultants left because we asked them to. We
 wanted them to leave because of their attitude
 [ toward teamwork]. For example , the phrase "this
 is your process " was regularly used by a consultant.
 His indifference was unacceptable. Our people saw
 the project as a team effort. (Corporate Support)
 Resolution
 Within three months, the project began to turn around. The
 BU representatives and vendors worked together in greater
 unison and were more willing to accommodate one another.
 The results were a higher degree of standardization, more
 integrated design, and speedier progress.
 Momentum has improved. There 's ownership . . . also
 the people on the ground working together has
 helped things too. (Corporate IT Director)
 Although requirements analysis was completed two months
 late, the momentum created ensured the project rolled out its
 first implementation on schedule in April 2005. The original
 target of 60 percent standardization in logistics processes
 across the BUs was exceeded.
 Earlier on, I didn 't want to over-sell standardiza-
 tion. The minimum was 60 percent, the figure in the
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 contract. But I had hoped for 80-plus percent. In
 the end, after we had gone through all processes in
 great detail, we delivered more than 80% stan-
 dardization ! (A VP Logistics)
 Team members began focusing on the success of the entire
 project instead of just ensuring their own respective jobs got
 done. For example, BU representatives helped during the
 system integration test, a task that was earlier regarded as
 being the sole responsibility of the vendor. The vendor and
 subcontractor consultants, similarly, did " more than what they
 were supposed to do ." When the warranty clause expired, the
 subcontractor volunteered to stay on the project for another
 three months without additional payment.
 Discussion
 This case examines how clan control was enacted in a com-
 plex IT project within a few months. The team cooperation,
 consensus, and commitment at project end were in stark
 contrast to the initial state of self-interest, conflict, and
 indifference. This section presents two critical findings from
 our research: (1) how clan control can be enacted in an IT
 project, and (2) the role of formal authority in enabling clan
 control.
 Enactment of Clan Control
 Our case analysis suggests that, with proactive action, it is
 possible to enact clan control within a few months, in large,
 complex IT projects. Such enactment requires a targeted
 focus on the dual process of building the clan - by developing
 its structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions or reappro-
 priating existing social capital from elsewhere - and lever-
 aging the clan - by reinforcing project- facilitating norms and
 inhibiting those that impede the achievement of project goals.
 Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework summarizing our
 findings.
 Building the Clan
 Our case reveals targeted efforts of the controller, in partner-
 ship with team members, to build the structural, cognitive,
 and relational dimensions of social capital.
 In this case, enhancing the structural dimension means
 removing physical and organizational obstacles that impede
 interactions. New work orientations (e.g., scenarios over-
 laying the tracks), knocking down walls, and the creation of
 congregational space created a new working environment
 encouraging interaction. Building the cognitive dimension
 means providing a common language and consistent reference
 perspective for effective communication and coordination.
 The abandonment of separate process modeling notations in
 favor of a new common process modeling notation created
 words and meanings that helped stakeholders negotiate and
 reconcile differences. Developing the relational dimension
 means strengthening the relational bonds within the project
 team. It goes beyond cordial social activities like dinners and
 soccer games. In this project, much relationship building was
 associated with the projection of management sincerity and
 honesty. Corporate management led by example by sub-
 jecting itself to the same ban of long vacation leave as con-
 trollees. Corporate management also encouraged controllees
 to raise issues and took concrete steps to resolve difficulties.
 We also saw how corporate management quickly built the
 clan by reappropriating social capital from subcontractor
 consultants. The bulk import of consultants helped jump-start
 the work late norm. Our study thus demonstrates that social
 capital can be imported from outside a project.
 Our case analysis further demonstrates that clan building
 efforts reinforce one another. For example, the effects of
 bringing in large numbers of subcontractor consultants (in
 reappropriating social capital) were clearly accentuated by the
 physical collocation of users and consultants (with the
 enhanced structural ties).
 Leveraging the Clan
 We saw proactive actions by corporate management in
 lev raging the clan as they sought to influence the promul-
 gation of project members' shared beliefs, values, and norms
 to encourage project success. Corporate management wanted
 to leverage the emergent work late, one team, and one enter-
 prise norms to drive project outcomes. Reinforcing actions
 employed by corporate management included the formal
 appointment of subcontractor consultants as track leads,
 establishment of joint corporate-user-consultant respon-
 sibility, and institution of a peer voting system. Inhibiting
 actions took the form of suppressing values and norms that
 might harm the project, such as in sanctioning and removing
 noncooperative consultants or discouraging BU-centric
 thinking. Corporate management was concerned that negative
 attitudes could potentially damage emerging values and norms
 that benefitted the project.
 These actions to leverage norms required that social capital be
 already present. The underlying structural, cognitive, and
 relational ties enabled the quick propagation and enforcement
 of such norms by enhancing the visibility of peer behaviors.
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 In turn, visibility encouraged the imitation of peer behaviors.
 For example, consultants and users stayed late only after they
 observed subcontractor consultants doing so. Similarly, the
 identification of uncooperative members was typically not a
 top-down decision. Such consultants were identified through
 feedback from users.
 In addition, without sufficient social capital, certain actions to
 leverage the clan such as the peer voting system and joint
 corporate-user-consultant accountability could have degen-
 erated into finger-pointing, blame-shifting, and mutual
 sabotage. These actions required the presence of strong social
 capital so that users and vendors would cooperate and give-
 and-take. Finally, actions to leverage the clan were effective,
 because enough project members were manifesting expected
 norms. For example, enough consultants had to display a
 norm of cooperation so that removing uncooperative consul-
 tants did not overly compromise project staffing.
 Perhaps the most striking example that leveraging the clan for
 control requires existing social capital is the failure of the
 initial clan controls. The memorandum of understanding did
 not create a norm of cooperation, because personnel in the
 logistics organization and vendor had few existing ties to each
 other then. The speech by the CEO failed to create a commit-
 ment to standardization, because users were skeptical of
 project goals and of each other. Thus, attempts to leverage
 the clan without strong social capital are likely to yield
 ineffective clan control.
 The Role of Formal Authority
 Contrary to prior research which suggests that formal author-
 ity is the antithesis of clan control (Cardinal et al. 2004;
 Gittell 2000), our analysis suggests that controllers as a
 formal authority play a critical role in enabling the enactment
 of clan control. Formal authority appears to contribute in two
 ways. First, it significantly accelerates the enactment of clan
 control by tapping its ready access to organizational power
 and resources.
 • Figure of Authority. In enacting clan control, con-
 trollers exerted substantial organizational power. Where
 necessary, they employed power stemming directly from
 their position in the organizational hierarchy to define
 and monitor desired project outcomes. In facilitating the
 building and leveraging of the clan, for example, corpor-
 ate management had the power to bring in a subcon-
 tractor team, to mandate use of the common modeling
 language, and to remove uncooperative project members.
 • Symbol. Controllers' roles as symbols facilitated certain
 kinds of social capital building. For example, soccer
 games, karaoke sessions, and dinners were successful, in
 part, because corporate management personally invited
 people to attend. Controllees would have been less
 willing to attend had they been invited by another con-
 trollee, because participation might signal a desire to
 avoid work. That corporate management invited con-
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 trollees demonstrated that participation in functions was
 acceptable behavior.
 Resourcing/Approval. Finally, many social capital
 building mechanisms required organizational support and
 would not have worked without controller involvement.
 For example, the re-architecting of rooms and workshops
 were suggested by various consultants (i.e., it emerged
 from the clan). However, consultants did not have the
 resources or power to re-architect rooms or encourage
 user representatives to attend workshops, and needed
 corporate management's power to enact their proposals.
 The second way formal authority contributes to the enactment
 of clan control relates to the public goods aspect of social
 capital. Coleman (1988) noted that
 the kinds of social structures that make possible
 social norms and the sanctions that enforce them do
 not benefit primarily the persons whose efforts
 would be necessary to bring them about, but benefit
 all those who are part of such a structure (p. SI 16).
 As benefits cannot be restricted to specific persons, there is a
 tendency to underinvest in building social capital. State
 intervention is often necessary to produce this "public good."
 This is especially true during early stages of social capital
 development where shared norms are not established. Formal
 authority serves as a guarantor, ensuring integrity in the
 socialization process. Formal authority can establish expecta-
 tions of acceptable clan behaviors, reducing the need for
 lengthy relational exploration to build trust in the social
 system. Formal authority provides safeguards to ensure
 fairness and reciprocity in the socialization process before real
 trust in the social system develops. In our case, such acts as
 making user-vendor pairings accountable for a scenario and
 establishing a voting system for business processes helped
 establish rules for engagement between clan members.
 Our observations are thus consistent with prior research by
 Adler and Borys (1996) who distinguish between enabling
 and coercive bureaucracies in organizations. Their work
 notes how formal structures and procedures can develop the
 fabric of informal cooperation. Likewise, Evans (1996) sug-
 gests that state involvement can buttress rather than under-
 mine social capital in civil society. We find controllers play
 an instrumental role in enacting clan control. They have
 access to significant resources (including formal control) to
 build and leverage the clan. In our case, formal control was
 deployed to build shared structure, cognition, and relation-
 ships to facilitate the development of clan control or to
 reinforce/inhibit clan norms. For example, the imposition of
 a common modeling language was a formal (behavioral)
 control mechanism that facilitated the building of cognitive
 ties among members. Similarly, the peer voting system was
 a formal (outcome) control mechanism that accentuated clan
 norms of enterprise orientation. Thus, mindfully employed,
 formal control can amplify clan control. When well-aligned
 with the shared norms, beliefs, and values of the clan, the
 simultaneous deployment of both formal and clan control
 need not be a zero-sum game.
 Contributions to Behavioral Control Theory
 Our research refines and enriches behavioral control theory in
 three ways. First, it reconciles the differing views on clan
 control. Prior literature on clan control has approached it
 from two perspectives, (1) that clan control leverages on an
 existing clan to control (Jaworski 1988; Jaworski et al. 1993;
 Kohli and Kettinger 2004), and (2) clan control concerns the
 building of the clan (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Rowe
 and Wright 1997). Our study reconciles these two perspec-
 tives by demonstrating that clan control requires both the
 building and leveraging of the clan to succeed. In doing so,
 it also helps to explain why social capital is important to clan
 control, going beyond recent research that has already demon-
 strated a strong link between the two constructs (Kirsch et al.
 2010). Social capital is necessary for building the clan, and
 without social capital in place, leveraging the clan is
 impossible.
 Our second contribution is explaining the role of controllers
 in enacting clan control. Prior literature tends to emphasize
 the role of peer enforcement of norms in clan control. For
 example, Kirsch et al. (2002) noted that clan control is
 enforced by group members as each strives to be "a regular
 member of the project team" (p. 494). Choudhury and
 Sabherwal (2003), similarly, note that in clan control "each
 member effectively functions as both controller and con-
 trollee" (p. 292). They do not explain how controllers employ
 peer monitoring and sanctions to control. Our study high-
 lights that controllers play an instrumental role in employing
 significant resources and authority to influence the building
 and leveraging of the clan. The social capital perspective in
 clan control helps make a stronger distinction between con-
 trollers and controllees. Our conceptualization recognizes not
 only the peer aspect (e.g., peer sanctions, rewards, norm crea-
 tion), but also the controller aspect of clan control (i.e., by
 building social capital and leveraging norms, values, and
 beliefs developed by peers). Recognizing the role of con-
 trollers aligns the enactment of clan control more consistently
 with the underlying principal-agency perspective of behav-
 ioral control theory (Eisenhardt 1985, 1989a).
 Our third contribution lies in clarifying the relationship
 between formal and clan control (Choudhury and Sabherwal
 2003; Kirsch 1997). Prior research suggests these controls
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 may be complementary, but has not revealed how and why
 (Grabski and Leech 2007; Grabski et al. 2002). Our research
 reveals that controllers have access to substantial resources
 (including control resources such as formal controls), and
 such controls can be used not only to drive controllees toward
 project outcomes, but also to develop other controls. Mind-
 fully employed, formal controls can build shared structure,
 cognition, and relationships to facilitate the development of
 clan control or to reinforce/inhibit clan norms. Our research
 thus partly clarifies how clan and formal control can work
 together in a portfolio; one strategy is to employ one form of
 control to build the other.
 Conclusion and Future Research ■■■■
 This research sets out to explore how clan control can be
 enacted in IT projects. To answer this question, this research
 had to simultaneously answer the question "what is clan con-
 trol?" Through a longitudinal study of a large enterprise sys-
 tem project, we discover that clan control requires strong
 social capital. Social capital in its structural, cognitive, and
 relational dimensions facilitates the emergence of norms. The
 controller's role in clan control is to build and reappropriate
 social capital, and to reinforce norms that benefit a project,
 while inhibiting norms detrimental to it. Our study not only
 sharpens the conceptual clarity of clan control, it also bears
 strong implications for practice. It adds a strategic and inter-
 ventionist orientation to accelerate the enactment of clan
 control by suggesting specific ways to build and leverage the
 clan. The need for proactive intervention is becoming
 increasingly important as businesses initiate larger and more
 complex IT projects for which enactments of clan control will
 be crucial.
 Several limitations of our study should be addressed by future
 research. Our study focuses on how clan control can be
 enabled within a short time frame. We elaborate how it is
 enacted through the dual processes of clan building and
 leveraging using the social capital perspective. Non-clan
 control related factors associated with project success could
 influence the efficacy of clan control in IT projects. This is
 especially salient given our case contains factors identified by
 the project turnaround literature as common in turnarounds.
 For example, our case saw the introduction of key people
 during the turnaround period (Iacovou and Dexter 2004).
 Similarly, the turnaround occurred in a short span of time
 (Engwall and Westling 2004).
 While these are important considerations, including them in
 our paper would not only significantly expand its scope and
 complexity, but also dilute our focus of explicating clan con-
 trol processes. Furthermore, other research has established
 the causal relationship between clan control and project suc-
 cess (Henderson and Lee 1992). We argue that suspending
 non-clan control related factors during our analysis maintains
 the simplicity of our conceptual framework without sacri-
 ficing its ability to make sense of clan control processes.
 Future studies could examine how non-clan control related
 factors regulate project turnaround processes.
 The Asian context of this study must also be considered in
 assessing the generalizability of findings. While we believe
 our model of clan control enactment is applicable to all
 contexts, the specific actions in building or leveraging the
 clan are likely to vary. For example, whereas relational ties
 were built through various social activities, including karaoke,
 in Sweden, such clan building practices are likely to revolve
 around fika , or the coffee break.
 We also acknowledge that in large, complex projects, there
 are likely to be multiple control dyads (Soh et al. 201 1). We
 focus this paper on the highest level control dyad within the
 project, between the corporate project management team, and
 all other team members, as our primary objective was to
 examine how the main project controllers facilitated the
 enactment of clan control across the project team as a whole.
 Future studies should examine the interactions across multiple
 control dyads within large, multistakeholder projects.
 Finally, our study focuses on the successful deployment of
 clan control alongside formal control. However, other studies
 have documented organizations that willingly cede clan con-
 trol to obtain formal control. The factors that encourage
 tradeoffs versus complementarity between both kinds of
 controls need to be further explored.
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